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It’s All Relative: Familial DNA Testing and the
Fourth Amendment
Amanda Pattock*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the streets of Los Angeles, California, were
plagued by several serial killers. 1 Among the most brutal was a
man coined the “Grim Sleeper.” 2 The Grim Sleeper picked up
prostitutes whom he raped and then violently murdered by
shooting or strangulation. 3 Between the years of 1985 and
1988, the Grim Sleeper attacked and murdered eight known
victims. 4 At the end of 1988, the only victim known to survive
the attack came forward. 5 After the surviving victim came

© 2011 Amanda Pattock.
* Amanda Pattock is a December 2011 J.D. candidate at the University of
Minnesota Law School. She received her B.A. in 2009 from the University of
Michigan with majors in Sociology and English. After law school Amanda will
be moving to Austin, Texas where she will take the bar exam.
1. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Rebecca Cathcart, In Los Angeles,
Unsolved Serial Killings Reflected Era, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 19, 2010, at A11
(describing the spate of violent serial killings in Los Angeles during the
1980s).
2. Greg Miller, Scientists Explain how Familial DNA Testing Nabbed
Alleged Serial Killer, SCI. INSIDER (July 12, 2010, 1:18 PM)
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/07/scientists-explain-howfamilial.html.
3. Steinhauer & Cathcart, supra note 1.
4. Sarah Ardalani, Map: Grim Sleeper Killings, 1985-2007, L.A. TIMES,
http://projects.latimes.com/homicide/list/grim-sleeper-killings/ (last visited
Apr. 16. 2011) (providing a map listing the Grim Sleeper’s victims by date and
other statistics).
5. Steinhauer & Cathcart, supra note 1 (describing the experience of a
woman, Enietra Washington, who was shot, sexually assaulted, and
photographed before being pushed into the street and survived to give police
details that fit with previous murders).
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forward, the Grim Sleeper took a fourteen year hiatus. 6
However, in 2002 the Grim Sleeper struck again, and from
2002 until 2007, three additional victims were identified. 7
On July 7, 2010—fifteen years after the attacks began—
police finally arrested the Grim Sleeper. 8 Unable to locate him
using traditional means of identification, the police turned to a
relatively new technology: familial Deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) testing. 9 Using DNA from the victims, police identified a
partial DNA match. 10 The match belonged to Christopher
Franklin, a young adult convicted of a felony weapons charge
one year prior. 11 At the time of the first murders, Christopher
was not yet born, so detectives looked instead to male family
members that would have been appropriately aged at the time
of the murders. 12 Using this line of inquiry, the police identified
Christopher’s father, Lonnie Franklin Jr., as the most likely
suspect. 13 Law enforcement officials then collected a discarded
piece of pizza from Lonnie Franklin Jr.’s trash and confirmed
that his DNA was a full match to the DNA found on the
victim. 14 After twenty-five years and eleven murders, the killer
was finally caught. 15
Familial DNA testing has been hotly contested across the
country, but its usefulness in helping law enforcement officials
catch and prosecute criminals is well established. 16 This Note
argues that the benefits of familial DNA testing outweigh any
invasion of privacy rights, specifically with regard to the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unwarranted search
and seizure. Part II first explores what DNA is, how it is used

6. Id. (noting that the 14 year hiatus from killing led to Franklin being
coined the Grim Sleeper” due, according to one theory, to the fact that the final
victim’s survival spooked the killer into hiding).
7. Id.
8. Miller, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. (noting that the DNA search combined with the dates of the
murder led police to the father).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Ardalani et al., supra note 4.
16. See Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Grim Sleeper’ Arrest Fans Debate on DNA
Use, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2010, at A14 (noting that police and district attorney’s
call the practice “essential” to catching elusive criminals).
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to identify individuals, and how DNA is stored. Then, a
definition of familial DNA testing and a brief overview of
current legislation pertaining to familial DNA testing follows.
The final portion of Part II discusses challenges against DNA
collection under the Fourth Amendment. Part III applies a
Fourth Amendment analysis to familial DNA searching, and
concludes with suggestions for limiting the way in which
familial DNA is conducted. This Note ultimately concludes that
familial DNA testing is constitutional and, as a policy matter,
provides benefits to society that outweigh any potential
intrusion of individual’s privacy.
II. BACKGROUND
A THE MAKINGS OF GOOD GENES: DNA
In order to fully understand the mechanics and
implications of familial DNA testing on individual’s privacy
rights, it is essential to understand what DNA is, how it is
created, and how it is used as an identifying tool. The following
is a brief overview of the mechanics of DNA, and an
explanation of how DNA is used to identify individuals, to aid
the reader in understanding why individuals subjected to
familial DNA testing feel that their privacy is invaded.
1. Mechanics of DNA
DNA, is genetic material that assists in determining each
person’s individual characteristics. 17 Every person has, on
average, fifty to one hundred trillion cells, and nearly all of
these cells contain forty-six chromosomes composed of DNA. 18
Together, these chromosomes make up the genome of each
individual. 19 Specifically, a human genome contains forty-six
chromosomes which are paired and numbered, one through
twenty-two, in addition to a sex-determining chromosome of

17. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 27–28 (2d ed. 2005) (noting
the genetic variability in the human population due to DNA); NORAH RUDIN &
KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 33 (2d ed.
2002) (describing the small portion of DNA in humans through which
individual traits are manifested through).
18. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender
Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 248 248–249
(2006).
19. Id.
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either two X chromosomes or one X and one Y chromosome. 20
Each individual receives from their parent a parental genome,
comprised of one of the twenty-two pairs of chromosomes and
one of the sex chromosomes. 21 This parental genome consists of
approximately 3.2 billion base pairs of DNA, and each base pair
serves as one rung of the DNA molecule. 22 Thus, an
individual’s complete chromosomal package is a blend of onehalf of the mother’s chromosomes and one-half of the father’s
chromosomes. 23
To further understand the human genome, it is important
to note that chromosomes are comprised of billions of base pairs
of DNA. 24 These base pairs are created by the pairing of two
out of four nucleotides. 25 The pairing of nucleotides is a very
specific process: adenine (A) pairs with thymine (T) and
guanine (G) pairs with cytosine (C). 26 After pairing up, the
nucleotides then form a sequence of A-T, T-A, G-C, and C-G
pairs. 27 This phenomenon, known as genetic sequencing,
creates the genes that determine everything from an
individual’s hair color to her height. 28
The human genome contains both coding and non-coding
genes. Approximately three percent of the genome is
programmed to code for ribonucleic acid (RNA), while about
four percent is programmed to code for other important, but so
far unknown, functions. 29 The remaining ninety-three percent
of the genome contains non-coding genes that appear to serve
no known function. 30 The non-coding genes are comprised of a
series of short tandem repeats (STRs) in which stretches of
varying numbers and copies of genetic sequences appear. 31
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A
Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 7
(2010).
25. Greely, et al., supra note 18, at 249.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.; See also Gabel, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that genes define traits
like eye color and shoe size).
29. Greely, et al., supra note 18, at 249.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Each stretch of varying repeats forms a different allele. 32 Each
of these alleles occupies a fixed locus—a specific location—on a
particular chromosome. 33 This fixed location allows the alleles
to serve as genetic markers. 34 These genetic markers are the
key to using DNA as a means of identification. 35
2. DNA as a Tool for Identification
Humans are 99.9 percent identical—leaving only 0.1
percent of DNA to differentiate every member of society. 36 To
date, scientists believe that ninety-three percent of the human
genome serves no function other than playing a structural role
in the physical activity of the chromosome. 37 It is these noncoding regions of DNA, also known as “junk” DNA, that store
the genetic information used to identify matches. 38
Presently, DNA cannot be used to identify any particular
individual. 39 Instead, STRs are used as a means of comparing
whether one sample of DNA is from the same source as another
sample of DNA. STRs are located on a fixed point on a
chromosome; the locus of an STR is thus an identifiable
quantity that can be used as a marker from which a
comparison can be drawn against the STRs of other
individuals. 40 DNA is not, therefore, used as a means of
identifying one specific person, but rather as a way to compare
whether one DNA sample came from the same individual as
another DNA sample.
The sequence of STR alleles is not unique to every
individual, despite varying heavily from person to person. 41 As
a result, it is necessary for multiple STR alleles to be analyzed

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LAWRENCE F. KOBLINSKY ET AL., DNA: FORENSIC AND LEGAL
APPLICATIONS 17 (2004).
37. Greely, et al., supra note 18, at 249.
38. Id. Gabel, supra note 24, at 8–9.
39. Crime labs can, however, identify whether a particular DNA sample
came from a male or female. They accomplish this by testing for amelogenin,
another genetic marker, which presents itself in two different lengths in
males, and only one length in females. This allows investigators to determine
the sex of an individual whose DNA has been collected. BUTLER, supra note
17, at 113–15.
40. Gabel, supra note 24, at 10.
41. Id.
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as a means of increasing accuracy. Typically, crime labs in the
United States use thirteen STR markers (CODIS markers)
situated over twelve chromosomes. 42 By analyzing these
thirteen alleles, crime labs greatly reduce the risk of
discovering a false match. Specifically, “[t]he odds that an
unrelated person shares the same set of thirteen pairs are
normally infinitesimal–—at most one in several hundred
billion, compared with a total of 6.3 billion living humans.” 43
On average, two random Americans share about two or three
alleles. 44 By comparing thirteen alleles, it is thus extremely
unlikely that a false match would be identified.
B. DNA COLLECTION AND STORAGE: CODIS
Once the DNA of an individual has been collected for
analysis, it is run through the national DNA database. In order
to understand the privacy concerns individuals have regarding
the effects of storing individual DNA in a national database, it
is important to first understand the history and mechanics of
the United States’ national DNA database, the Combine DNA
Index System (CODIS). In Part II.B.I, a brief overview of the
history of CODIS is provided. Then, Part II.B.2 provides an
overview of how CODIS aids law enforcement officials in using
DNA as an identifier. Finally, Part II.B.3 discusses particular
advantages and concerns that individuals have expressed in
response to the CODIS system.
1. History of CODIS
The CODIS program was created in 1990 by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a pilot program in crimesolving. 45 CODIS operates on three levels: national, state, and
local, with each lower-tier communicating with the highertier. 46 The national program, the National Data Index System
(NDIS) was created by the DNA Identification Act of 1994. 47
42. Id. at 11.
43. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250.
44. Id.
45. CODIS
Brochure,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis_brochure (last visited Mar. 27,
2011).
46. See id. (describing the CODIS architecture as consisting of federal,
state, and local systems).
47. The DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
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The Act not only established a national DNA database, but also
dictated the indexes that may be created, and defined
requirements for participating laboratories regarding quality
assurance, privacy, and expungement. 48 There are several
indexes that are entered into CODIS: convicted offender,
forensic, arrestees, missing persons, unidentified human
remains, and biological relatives of missing persons. 49 The
DNA collected for each of these indexes is stored and available
to any approved law enforcement agency.
DNA is present in nearly every cell in the human body,
including blood, semen, teeth, hair, saliva, perspiration, nails,
urine, skin cells, and tissue. 50 Additionally, DNA can be
forensically useful for decades, though heat, mold, bacteria,
moisture, sunlight, and other environmental factors can
deteriorate the DNA, rendering it unusable. 51 As a result of the
many different ways DNA can appear at a crime scene,
investigators often have little trouble finding the genetic
fingerprint, making it a practical and ideal tool in crime
investigation. 52 As technological advancements emerged
surrounding DNA’s utility, it became necessary to create a
method of storing the collected samples. With this background
in mind, CODIS was created.
2. Mechanics of CODIS
CODIS functions as a DNA matchmaker. Once a DNA
sample is recovered from a crime scene, the information is
stored in the forensic index. 53 This information is then run
against the DNA samples in the offender index, which have
been collected from individuals convicted of a crime, and in
some states, individuals who have been arrested. 54 The person
2065–71 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
48. Id.
49. CODIS Brochure, supra note 45.
50. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT DNA (1999).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Thirty-four states have adopted an “all-felony” policy, in which only
felons are required to submit DNA samples. At least thirty-eight states also
include some misdemeanors in their list of qualifying offenses. Additionally,
four states—California, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia—permit the DNA from
arrestees to be taken. Seth Axelrad, Survey of State DNA Database Statutes,
AM. SOC’Y OF L. MED. & ETHICS, http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/guide.pdf
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conducting the search specifies whether they would like a high,
medium, or low stringency search. 55 A high stringency search
means that all thirteen alleles from the two samples being
compared must match. 56 A medium or moderate stringency
match is specifically dictated by the searcher, who may define
exactly how many allele matches they would like. 57 Finally, a
low stringency search will return matches in which at least one
allele is similar. 58 The results of moderate and low stringency
searches are called partial matches, while the result of a high
stringency search is designated a full match. 59
A partial match surfaces in two ways. The first is by
running a degraded sample of DNA against the offender index
in the hopes of getting a “cold hit.” 60 The second is by running a
full forensic sample against the offender index in search of a
sample that has some, but not all, of the alleles in common. 61
In the event a partial match is found, the identity of the
matched person is not considered a suspect, but rather a
pivot. 62 A pivot “functions as a genetic beacon who may point
the way to the actual source, someone who shares a similar
profile with the pivot—a family member.” 63 After finding either
the identity of a cold hit, or a pivot, the law enforcement officer
is able to proceed with the investigation armed with a starting
place for their questioning. It is in this fashion that CODIS
facilitates familial DNA testing.
3. CODIS Advantages and Concerns
The advantages of the CODIS program are undeniable.
Since August 2010, CODIS has aided in more than 121,900
investigations by producing more than 124,800 hits. 64 This
(last accessed Oct. 20, 2010); see also John D. Biancamano, Note, Arresting
DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and their Fourth
Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 626–29 (2009) (summarizing
state statutes regarding DNA sampling coverage).
55. Gabel, supra note 24, at 17.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 17–18.
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. CODIS—NDIS Statistics Clickable Map, FED. BUREAU OF
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provides investigators with not only the ability to solve crimes,
thus aiding society by keeping it safe, but by also clearing
suspects of crimes they did not commit. 65 Additionally, the
CODIS system’s ability to identify victims’ remains is
unparalleled. 66 Without the use of CODIS many family
members would be unaware that their missing child, parent, or
sibling’s remains were in police custody as unidentifiable.
Despite the advantages, critics of the CODIS system have
suggested that storing such personal information in a database
is destined to end in a breach of privacy. 67 Although the
information stored in the national database of DNA contains no
identifiable information (only the DNA profile, the agency
identifier, a specimen identification number, and the name of
one DNA laboratory personnel associated with the DNA
analysis are stored in DNA databases), 68 critics assert that if
DNA is contained on the database, it would become possible to
identify a certain individual’s propensity to disease, illness, or
addictions. 69 As a result, critics fear that maintaining the DNA
of individuals in a nationwide database may lead to severe
abuse of the system.
C. FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING
When a DNA sample is entered into the CODIS system the
ideal situation is for an exact match to be identified. An exact
DNA match provides the identity of the DNA source, thus
providing investigators with a solid lead for their
investigation. 70 However, most often the investigator is
provided with a sample that returns no exact matches. When
INVESTIGATION, http://www2.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2010).
65. The Innocence Project has used DNA testing to exonerate more than
250 people in 34 states since 1989. About Us: FAQs, THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/How_many_people_have_been_exone
rated_through_DNA_testing.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
66. See CODIS Brochure, supra note 45(noting that identifying missing
persons is a priority of the CODIS program).
67. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 24, at 48–52 (noting the risks of storing
genetic information in DNA databases, including data security and privacy
concerns).
68. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250.
69. Lina Alexandra Hogan, Fourth Amendment—Guilt by Relation: If
Your Brother is Convicted of a Crime, You Too May Do Time, 30 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 543, 550 (2008).
70. Gabel, supra note 24, at 17. .
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this situation presents itself, another, more controversial,
option is to run the DNA through the CODIS system in search
of a partial match.
In contrast to an exact DNA match, which identifies the
source of the DNA, a partial match may indicate that the two
sources are related biologically. 71 When searching for a partial
match, investigators specify exactly how many allele matches
they would like CODIS to return. Typically, “identical twins
will share all thirteen pairs—and first degree relatives (parent,
sibling, or child) on average will share at least half.” 72 Second
degree relatives, such as uncles, aunts, grandparents, nieces,
nephews, and half-siblings will share only one quarter of their
DNA. 73 Armed with this information, investigators seek partial
matches and then use the results to question those individuals
with the greatest likelihood of being related to the original
DNA source. 74
D. CURRENT STATUS OF STATE DNA SEARCHING LEGISLATION
In 2002 the first familial database search was conducted in
the U.K., leading investigators to the son of Joseph Kappen—a
serial rapist from the 1970s. 75 Since this time U.S. states have
individually attempted to define whether familial searching is
permissible within their jurisdictions. Most states have left
their policies on partial match reporting and familial searching
unwritten. 76 This lack of transparency makes it difficult to

71. States
Using
Familial
Searches,
DNAFORENSICS.COM,
http://dnaforensics.com/statesandfamilialsearches.aspx (last visited Apr. 6,
2011).
72. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250.
73. Id. at 252.
74. Despite efforts at conducting as high stringency test as possible, false
positives will occur. A 2008 study found that this was true even when allelic
rarity was considered. See Thomas Reid et al., Use of Sibling Pairs to
Determine the Familial Searching Efficiency of Forensic Databases, 2
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 340, 341 (2008).
75. Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and
Intrusiveness: Issues in the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of
Criminal Investigations, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 545, 554 (2005). Investigators
ran DNA through a familial search, turning up the son of Joseph Kappen.
Though Kappen was dead, the family provided investigators with permission
to exhume his body. The DNA taken from this procedure proved Kappen’s
guilt, allowing victims and their families to finally know the truth about what
happened.
76. Natalie Ram, DNA Confidential, SCIENCE PROGRESS, (Nov. 2, 2009),
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determine which law enforcement agencies use familial
searching. 77 Maryland is currently the only state to ban
familial searching outright. 78
Only four states have expressly approved the use of
familial searching. 79 In 2009, Colorado issued a DNA Familial
Search Policy, which authorizes the release of partial matches
and use of familial DNA searching. 80 Similarly, California
released an information bulletin outlining procedures that
must be followed when conducting and utilizing familial DNA
searches. 81 Both New York and Virginia have passed
legislation giving law enforcement authority to perform partial
DNA searches. 82 In addition, other states have permitted
familial DNA searches in practice, but have not codified or
regulated their use.. 83

http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/11/dna-confidential.
77. Familial
DNA
Searches,
FINDLAW,
http://criminal.findlaw.com/crimes/criminal_rights/your-rights-search-andseizure/familial-dna-search.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
78. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A person
may not perform a search of the statewide DNA data base for the purpose of
identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender
may be a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was
acquired.”).
79. California, Colorado, New York, and Florida. States Using Familial
Searches, supra note 71; see also Lauren Keiper, More States Use Familial
DNA As Powerful Forensic Search Tool, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2011, 8:36 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/31/us-crime-dna-familialidUSTRE72T2QS20110331.
80. COLO. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DNA FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY
(2009),
available
at
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Familial_DNA/CBI%20DNA%20Fa
milial%20Search%20Policy%20Oct%202009%20-%20Signed.pdf (detailing that
family members should not be questioned until a suspect has been isolated
using traditional detective work and the public records have been checked to
verify that a familial relationship exists in fact).
81. Information Bulletin from Lance Gima, Bureau of Forensic Services,
to All California Law Enforcement Agencies and District Attorneys Offices, on
DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene DNA Profile to Offender) Policy, Bureau of
Forensic
Servs.,
(1999),
available
at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1548_08-bfs-01.pdf (stating that
a DNA partial match results when at least fifteen STR alleles match).
82. States Using Familial Searches, supra note 71; Keiper, supra note 79.
83. States Using Familial Searches, supra note 71 (noting that Florida
has conducted familial DNA searches by running the DNA of children born to
rape victims through CODIS as a means of identifying the child’s father).
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E. SURVIVING CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER: DNA TESTING VS.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The constitutionality of familial DNA testing has yet to be
addressed by courts. However, DNA testing and the CODIS
system have been the object of a great deal of litigation since
the 1980s. The most litigated aspect of DNA testing involves
the Fourth Amendment. 84 Challengers of DNA testing argue
that mandatory DNA sampling amounts to an unreasonable
search and seizure, thus violating the Fourth Amendment. 85 In
this regard, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that an extraction and analysis of a biological sample is a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 86 Having established
that DNA extraction is a search, courts must subsequently
address whether extraction amounts to an unreasonable
seizure, which is a seizure that is absent probable cause. 87
The Fourth Amendment requires that probable cause exist
when conducting a search and seizure. 88 However, courts have
carved out two exceptions to circumvent the probable cause
requirement. The first is to analyze the situation under the
“totality of the circumstances test,” or the balancing test. 89 The
84. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
85. Other challenges against mandatory DNA testing have been brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Eight
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Due Process
Clause, and on grounds of separation of powers. Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra
Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law
Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 146–51 (2001).
86. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001)
(holding that the analysis of a urine sample was a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
(holding that taking and testing an individual’s blood are two separate
intrusions on an individual’s expectation of privacy); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 767 (1985) (holding that the forced extraction of a bullet from a
defendant’s body constituted a search); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770 (1966) (holding that taking a blood sample was an intrusion on an
individual’s right to privacy).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
88. See id.
89. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848–57 (2006) (using the
totality of the circumstances test); United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 7–9
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second is to analyze the case under the “special needs test.” 90
Part II.E.1 of this Note examines the way courts have treated
the totality of the circumstances test in the past. This is
followed in Part II.E.2 by an examination of the way courts in
the past have treated the special needs test.
1. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
The totality of the circumstances test is a form of a
balancing test that the majority of courts have employed when
upholding the constitutionality of the DNA Act. Under this test,
“[t]he touchstone of . . . analysis under the Fourth Amendment
is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal
security.” 91 Thus, under a totality of the circumstances test, the
court balances the intrusion to the individual against the
interests of society as a whole. 92
The totality of circumstances test was most notably applied
in United States v. Kincade 93 to uphold the constitutionality of
mandatory DNA extraction. The defendant, released on parole,
argued that he should not be required to submit to a mandatory
DNA test absent suspicion that he had committed another
crime in violation of his parole. 94 The court reasoned that as a
parolee, the defendant was subject to a lesser degree of privacy
than ordinary citizens, and that society’s interest in his
following the conditions of his parole outweighed any intrusion
of privacy he might experience. 95 Similarly, the totality of

(1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding the totality of the circumstances test more applicable than the special
needs test); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (using a
balancing of the interests test); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184
(3d Cir. 2005) (analyzing Fourth Amendment violation under the totality of
the circumstances test).
90. See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding
that probationers can be subject to suspicion-less searches based on the special
needs test); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding
that DNA extraction should be evaluated under the special needs test); United
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that forced
DNA extraction is based on the special needs test because DNA profiling
exceeds general law enforcement needs).
91. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004).
93. Id. at 821.
94. Id. at 816.
95. Id. at 838–39.
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circumstances test was utilized in United States v. Weikert to
uphold the mandatory DNA extraction of an individual
released from prison on a supervised probation period. 96 In that
case, the court reasoned that the government’s interests
outweighed the privacy interests of Weikert:
[T]he government’s important interests in monitoring and
rehabilitating supervised releasees, solving crimes, and exonerating
innocent individuals outweigh Weikert’s privacy interests, given his
status as a supervised releasee, the relatively minimal inconvenience
occasioned by a blood draw, and the coding of genetic information
that, by statute, may be used only for purposes of identification. 97

In sum, courts have held that DNA testing passes
constitutional muster under the totality of the circumstances
test when the greater good of society outweighs any invasion of
privacy.
2. The “Special Needs Test”
A minority of courts have justified the warrantless forced
collection of DNA using the “special needs test.” The special
needs test was developed as a means of legitimizing a search
when there was no warrant, probable cause, or suspicion of
individual wrongdoing. 98 The foundation of the special needs
test is that law enforcement officials need to be able to balance
an “individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
security” with “the government’s need for effective methods to
deal with breaches of public order.”99 There are two prongs that
must be satisfied under the special needs test: first, one must
show that there is a special need for the search; 100 second,
officials must show that there is a need “beyond the normal
need for law enforcement.” 101 Consequently, courts have
permitted warrantless searches in situations where a special
need beyond normal detective work can be demonstrated.
Illinois v. Lidster provides one example where the Court
found a warrantless search permissible. 102 In Lidster, police
positioned a checkpoint on a freeway in response to a hit and
96. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007).
97. Id. at 14.
98. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351–52 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
99. Id. at 337.
100. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000).
101. Id. at 37.
102. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
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run accident. 103 The purpose of the checkpoint was to question
anyone who may have any information about the accident. 104
During one of the stops Robert Lidster, while intoxicated,
almost hit an officer. 105 In his defense, Lidster posited that the
stop was an illegal search and seizure. 106 In validating the
search and seizure, the Court reasoned that “the law ordinarily
permits police to seek the voluntary cooperation of members of
the public in the investigation of a crime . . . voluntary requests
play a vital role in police investigatory work.” 107 In light of the
fact that traditional methods of investigation such as probable
cause and warrants are not always practical, the Court
recognized that at times society is best served by a need for
greater flexibility.
Lower courts have employed the special needs test utilized
by the Supreme Court in Lidster to justify DNA extraction. In
Nicholas v. Goord, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the mandatory extraction of DNA, noting that the government’s
special need was to create a DNA-indexing database to aid in
solving crimes. 108 Similarly, in United States v. Conley, the
Sixth Circuit found that mandatory DNA testing was
constitutional because the government had a special need to
obtain reliable identifying information, reduce recidivism, and
protect communities. 109
While courts have had success utilizing the special needs
test as a means of negating the need for probable cause, the
primary purpose prong (which requires a showing that DNA
extraction is needed for a purpose beyond regular detective
work) is the most difficult to prove. 110 However, needs such as
103. Id. at 422.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 425 (internal citations omitted).
108. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 669 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Green v.
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (permitting mandatory DNA
extraction based on the special need of creating a reliable identification
database from which past and future crimes could be solved); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that creating a DNAindexing database was a permissible special need).
109. United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 2007). See also
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (justifying DNA extraction by
concluding the need to reduce and prevent recidivism was a special need).
110. A majority of courts have utilized the “totality of the circumstances
test” to uphold DNA testing specifically because it is so difficult to satisfy the
“primary purpose” prong. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 22–23 (1st
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obtaining reliable identification, protecting communities,
assisting in solving past and future crimes, creating a DNAindexing database, and reducing and preventing recidivism
have all been cited by courts as a means of getting around the
primary purpose prong of the special needs test. 111 Further,
courts have found that the special needs test is most applicable
when the search is done for the purpose of acquiring
information, rather than looking for evidence of general
criminal wrongdoing. 112
To date, no courts have addressed whether familial DNA
testing is constitutional. However, as technology advances and
familial DNA testing is incorporated into crime-solving
techniques, courts will undoubtedly be called upon to evaluate
whether familial DNA testing is an unreasonable search and
seizure of innocent parties. This Note analyzes familial DNA
testing under the totality of circumstances test and then
applies the special needs test to familial DNA testing.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that familial DNA testing is
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment under both the
totality of the circumstances test and the special needs test.
III. ANALYSIS
A. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED: FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHES AND
THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
The totality of circumstances exception to the probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment permits courts to
apply a balancing test weighing the intrusion to the individual
against the interests of society as a whole. 113 There are many
considerations that must be taken into account when
determining whether releasing the identity of a partial DNA
match is an invasion of privacy. In what follows, Part III.A.1 of
this note addresses the interests of the government and society
with regard to familial DNA testing. Part III.A.2 addresses the
Cir. 2007) (arguing that while the government boasts non-law enforcement
objectives, the DNA Act was primarily enacted to aid law enforcement and
“[t]hus, the centrality of law enforcement objectives to the DNA Act buttresses
[the] conclusion that the totality of the circumstances analysis, rather than
the special needs analysis, is appropriate”).
111. See cases cited supra notes 108–109.
112. See Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 668.
113. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 827–28 (9th Cir. 2004).
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privacy interests at stake for individuals. Finally, Part III.A.3
weighs these interests against each other, ultimately
concluding that familial DNA testing is permissible under the
totality of the circumstances exception of the Fourth
Amendment.
1. It Matters to Me: Society’s Interest in Familial DNA
Testing
Society benefits from the use of familial DNA testing in
many ways. First, the use of identifying partial DNA matches
in investigations can serve to deter crime. The way the system
currently works is that an individual’s DNA is in CODIS if he
or she has been arrested or convicted of a crime. 114 In this
respect, DNA testing is proven to have a specific deterrence
effect because “offenders are keenly aware that DNA assists
tremendously in solving crimes and in prosecuting suspects.” 115
However, the current CODIS system does not provide
detectives with access to the DNA of first time offenders.
Consequently, in order to obtain the DNA of a first time
offender suspected of committing a crime, the individual would
have to voluntarily release the sample, or the police would have
to approach the individual with a warrant and collect it. Absent
a warrant or voluntary submission, the police have no way to
connect the DNA left at a crime scene to an individual who has
not previously been convicted of a crime. 116 Thus, though DNA
is a valuable tool in preventing recidivism, as the law currently
stands, it is not as helpful in deterring first-time offenders.
First-time offenders would more likely be deterred if it was
common knowledge that partial DNA matches are permitted. 117
Individuals who themselves have not committed a crime but
have a family member who has done so would be more easily

114. Gabel, supra note 28, at 14. See also supra text accompanying notes
45–49.
115. AVINASH BHATI, JUST. POL’Y CTR., QUANTIFYING THE SPECIFIC
DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF DNA DATABASES 55–56 (2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412058_dna_databases.pdf (finding that
DNA databases increase crime deterrence rates 2-3% and increase probative
crime deterrence 20-30%).
116. It is also possible police would have access to the DNA of those who
were a missing persons at one time, or who had been arrested in the few states
that permit storing the DNA of arrestees.
117. See generally Williams & Johnson, supra note 75, at 546 (suggesting
that DNA databases serve as a deterrent to potential criminal offenders).
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identified through the use of familial DNA testing. 118
Therefore, if an individual is considering whether or not to
commit a crime, she would also have to consider that her
previously convicted family members’ DNA may lead to her
capture. While this method may not deter crimes that happen
in the heat of the moment, it could prevent crimes that are
carefully planned out. Therefore, permitting law enforcement
officials to utilize partial match DNA tests could prevent a
number of first time offenders from joining the criminal ranks.
Another profound advantage weighing in society’s favor is
the increased rate of accuracy in identifying suspects. 119
Through the use of familial DNA testing, law enforcement
officials could more confidently identify suspects than they
currently are able to using traditional methods. That is, by
identifying individuals who are related to the criminal, the
suspect pool is quickly narrowed. 120 Through the use of DNA
police officers are more easily able to identify exactly who they
should, and who they should not be questioning. 121 The
advantage here is that individuals who are more likely to be
found guilty are focused on, while individuals who are not
likely to be guilty are not subjected to the stressful
investigation process.
An additional benefit to society is the potential cost and
time savings. 122 Police investigation is a time consuming,
expensive process. Law enforcement officials have to identify
everyone with any possible information related to the crime,
locate them, question them, piece all of their stories together,
and then evaluate who the lead suspects are. They then spend
hours, days, or weeks searching for the case-breaking
information needed to positively identify the actual criminal.
However, the use of DNA technology speeds this process up. By
quickly running DNA found at the crime scene, police can
118. Id. at 554.
119. See id at 546. (noting that DNA testing would allow law enforcement
officials the “ability to confidently eliminate innocent suspects from
investigations” and increase the likelihood of “generating reliable and
persuasive evidence for use in court”).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally id. (noting that “the potential to make speedy and robust
suspected offender identifications through automated profile comparisons in
[centralized] criminal justice databases” and “a reduction in the cost of many
investigations” make DNA testing beneficial).
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identify exactly who was at the crime scene. This information
can be obtained for about fifty to a hundred dollars a test, and
takes about ten minutes to process. 123 As a result, using DNA
tests can save law enforcement officials hundreds of hours of
time, 124 as well as save taxpayers’ money since police officers
will not have to be compensated for those wasted hours spent
questioning people who end up being unhelpful in solving the
case. In one Denver study on the impact of DNA testing on
property crimes, it was found that “[a]ctual two year savings to
the citizens and the City of Denver [was] more than $5 million
in police costs and $36.8 million in property loss. . ..” 125 If
familial DNA testing is added to the list of investigative tools
law enforcement officials are permitted to utilize, the money
and time saved will likely increase dramatically. By expanding
the DNA testing policies to include familial DNA testing, police
will be better able to quickly narrow their investigation,
creating a more cost-effective and efficient police force.
One final benefit familial DNA testing would provide
society is to boost public confidence in the justice system. 126
DNA testing is an extremely effective crime-solving tool,
meaning that the expansion of it would increase its
effectiveness. The use of DNA testing will allow society to feel
safer due to the immense accuracy DNA testing provides in
identifying the perpetrator. 127 Additionally, offenders convicted

123. Howard Safir & Peter Reinharz, DNA Testing: The Next Big CrimeBusting Breakthrough, CITY J., Winter 2007, at 49, 52.
124. DAVID LAZER, SEARCHING THE FAMILY TREE FOR SUSPECTS: ETHICAL
AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES IN THE FAMILIAL SEARCHING OF DNA
DATABASES
2
(Mar.
2008),
available
at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centersprograms/centers/taubman/policybriefs/lazer_final.pdf (“Given that the total
number of investigations aided from the database system to date in the US
[sic] exceeds 60,000, it is plausible that the widespread use of familial
searching could produce many thousands of useful leads almost overnight, just
based on the data already in the offender and crime scene databases.”).
125. SIMON ASHIKHMIN ET AL., DENVER DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
EFFECTIVENESS AND COST EFFICIENCY OF DNA EVIDENCE IN VOLUME CRIME:
DENVER
COLORADO
SITE
SUMMARY
10
(2008),
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/DNABurgrCostEfficiencyReserch1.
pdf (“The return on investment on every dollar spent with this system is
estimated to be $90.”).
126. Williams & Johnson, supra note 75, at 546 (suggesting that DNA
testing may increase “public confidence in policing and in the wider judicial
process”).
127. See id.; see also BHATI, supra note 115, at ix (noting the conviction of
guilty offenders and exoneration of the wrongfully convicted from increased
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using DNA testing are typically given longer sentences, thus
keeping criminals off the streets longer. 128 If familial DNA
testing is permitted, individuals convicted of crimes are more
likely to be apprehended because the investigative lead pool
would be expanded. 129 Accordingly, society would find comfort
in knowing that there is another reliable, successful tool out
there that can be used to positively identify criminals.
2. It’s None of Your Business: Individual’s Privacy Concerns
One concern individuals face when considering familial
DNA testing is that previously unknown genetic relationships
may come to light. That is, people fear long lost biological
siblings will be identified, or that individuals who believed they
were biologically related to their family will discover they are,
in fact, not biologically related. 130 Some fear that if this
information came out it would cause many problems within
their family. 131 Additionally, this information would be known
to the police officers and detectives who ran the investigation,
and in some circumstances this can be very embarrassing. If
the law officials know the family, there may be issues of
confidentiality. 132 Personal family secrets may become the
subject of public gossip. 133 Thus, individuals have concerns that
their family secrets will be on display in the event familial
DNA testing is permitted.
Another concern that individuals who oppose familial DNA
testing have is that familial DNA testing will lead investigators
to the wrong doors to ask for unnecessarily revealing
information. Critics fear that if familial DNA testing is
use of DNA evidence).
128. ASHIKHMIN ET AL., supra note 125, at 10 (“The presence of DNA
evidence results in a 10-fold increase in the average sentence time for
residential burglars and a 27-fold increase for commercial burglars. (13.9
years with DNA compared to 1.4 years in traditionally investigated cases in
residential burglaries, and accordingly 4.6 years to 2 months in commercial
burglaries).”).
129. LAZER, supra note 124, at 2 (conservatively estimating that
investigative leads produced by the DNA database system could be increased
by 40% if familial searching was permitted).
130. Cf. Williams & Johnson, supra note 75, at 556.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. (discussing how “[o]ther members of their household, their
wider kin groups and the communities in which they live, may or may not be
party to that knowledge”).
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permitted, individuals will unfairly be the subject of police
investigations. 134 Specifically, critics note that if familial DNA
testing is permitted, then minorities will be disproportionately
affected. 135 As a result, critics argue that it is an unwarranted
search and seizure and, as such, unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. 136
3. Survival of the Fittest: Society’s Interests are Greater than
the Individual’s Interest
Although there may be legitimate individual privacy
concerns, when viewed in totality, the interests of society are
greater than that of the individual. While individuals have an
interest in assuring that their family secrets remain secrets,
the use of familial DNA testing will not likely serve to bring
these secrets to light. As it stands now, the DNA that is stored
in CODIS cannot conclusively prove that one individual is or is
not related to another person. 137 As a result, the system is used
to suggest individuals who may be related, so that law
enforcement officials have a starting point in their
investigation. Therefore, the fear of familial secret being
exposed is minimal.
Another concern raised is that individual’s privacy will be
invaded by overly intrusive law enforcement officials. 138 While
it is true that some lines of questioning witnesses, victims,
suspects, and others endure may seem intrusive, questioning a
citizen based on the results of a familial DNA test is no more
intrusive than that permitted by traditional detective work. 139
134. Hogan, supra note 69, at 577–79 (fearing that expanding the use of
DNA technology will subject citizens to “arbitrary government intrusions”).
135. Cf. Daniel J. Grimm, The Demographics of Genetic Surveillance:
Familial DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1164, 1166 (2007) (arguing that the Hispanic community would be
disproportionately affected by familial DNA testing).
136. Hogan, supra note 69, at 582–85 (opining that familial DNA searches
violate the Fourth Amendment).
137. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250.
138. Hogan, supra note 69, at 577–79.
139. Critics Challenge Familial DNA Testing (NPR radio broadcast Feb.
28,
2007)
[hereinafter
NPR],
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7641971 (Ms. Tania
Simoncelli: “Denver DA Mitch Morrissey says police always have and always
will questions people who turn out to be innocent. He likens a partial DNA hit
to having an eyewitness who caught only half the license plate on a getaway
car.” Mr. Morrissey: “I think people would be outraged if the police just said
oh, it’s only a partial plate, so we’re not going to follow this up. The nature of
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Traditional investigative means require that police officers go
out and ask individuals questions. This means that with or
without familial DNA testing many individuals are subject to
questioning. What is important to note is that familial DNA
testing does not result in persons with partial matches being
considered suspects. Instead, when a partial match is
identified, it is assumed that person is related to the
perpetrator, but is not the perpetrator. As a result, police
question that individual as a means of catching the
perpetrator. This is no different than traditional field work.
Additionally, the same precautions that are in place now to
protect citizens against unnecessary police intrusion would
remain in effect. An individual can refuse to answer the police
officers questions should she chose to do so.
Further, while it is a justifiable fear that access to one’s
genetic predispositions could spell harm to individuals ranging
in the form of higher health insurance premiums to failing to
be hired for a job, the genetic information that is obtained
through DNA testing is currently considered useless. 140 DNA
tests are based on “junk DNA” that provide individuals looking
at the test with no useful genetic information about the
individual. 141 Thus, concerns about police having access to
private genetic information are currently unfounded, as there
is no useful information to be found. 142
Finally, critics’ concern that a disproportionate amount of
minorities would be subject to investigation is genuine. African
Americans, who only make up thirteen percent of the general
population, comprise forty percent of convicted felons. 143 As a
result, the DNA of minorities is overrepresented in CODIS,
making minority families more likely to be identified in a
familial DNA search. 144 What critics fail to acknowledge is that
police work is you have to talk to a lot of people.”).
140. Gabel, supra note 24, at 46 (“The CODIS markers are thought to hold
no diagnostic information; their sole value lies in their use as identification
tools.”).
141. Id.
142. In the future, it may be discovered that what is now considered “junk
DNA” may provide discoverable genetic information about the individuals. Id.
While this is beyond the scope of this paper, in the event this proves true,
procedural safeguards could be enacted to ensure that familial samples
collected are destroyed after their investigative purposes have been exhausted.
143. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 258.
144. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial
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despite the fact that more minorities will be identified through
a familial DNA search, it is nonetheless an accurate crime
fighting tool. Further, the intrusion is not any more invasive
than would be if traditional detective work had been utilized to
identify the subject. Traditional investigative work often
involves questioning the family members of suspects. As a
result of this investigative method, and the fact that minorities
are disproportionately convicted of crimes, minority families
are already targeted for questioning disproportionately.
Consequently, familial DNA testing would not result in any
more of an invasion of the privacy of minority families than the
use of traditional detective work.
When weighing the benefits to society against the invasion
of an individual’s privacy interests, society’s interests
ultimately overrule those of the individual. Considering the
substantial benefits society derives from the implementation of
familial DNA testing, including saving time, money, deterring
crime, and boosting the public’s confidence in the justice
system, the minimal invasion of an individual’s privacy is
justified.
B. IN THE NAME OF THE LAW: THERE IS A SPECIAL NEED
JUSTIFYING FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHES
There are many identifiable special needs when justifying
the utility of familial DNA searches. One is the special need to
identify and prosecute criminals so as to keep society safe.
Studies have shown that DNA testing provides a means of
prosecution in far more instances than traditional detective
work. 145 For example, one study conducted in Denver found
that of four-hundred burglaries in which DNA was left behind,
over seventy-six percent of them were prosecuted based on the
DNA, and would not have been prosecuted were it not for the
DNA. 146 The study found that the “use of DNA evidence results
in an almost 5.5-fold increase in the rate of case
prosecution.” 147 The government’s ability to keep the public
safe is one that cannot be taken lightly. It is clear that law
enforcement agencies, and the public in general, have a special
Searching, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 309, 370 (2010) (citing estimate that more
than four times the percentage of African Americans (17%) would be identified
as suspects as compared to Caucasians (4%) with the use of familial searches).
145. ASHIKHMIN ET AL., supra note 125, at 4–5.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at 10.
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need to use familial DNA searches. The ability to more
effectively identify and prosecute criminals is one special need
that can justify using the familial DNA testing.
The ability to deter crime is another identifiable special
need that justifies using familial DNA searching. Nationally,
7.3 million children have one or two parents in jail. 148 Of those,
seventy percent will commit a crime themselves. 149 The
government has a special need to reduce this rate. If children of
incarcerated parents know that their parents’ DNA can lead
law enforcement officials to them quickly and accurately, the
child may refrain from participating in criminal activity. Even
if only a few thousand of these children are deterred from
committing a crime, the special needs test remains justified.
Critics of familial DNA testing argue that while more
criminals may be caught through the use of familial DNA
testing, it is still not a justifiable technique. 150 “I mean, we
could put, you know, cameras in everybody’s living rooms and
say too bad, you know, and you could catch more criminals that
way, but that’s a bad way of making policy.” 151 Critics fear that
policy makers are taking crime-solving one step too far, and
unfairly invading the privacy interests of others by acting as a
“Big Brother.” 152 While it is true that some techniques in crimesolving, such as placing cameras in living rooms are better left
unexplored, familial DNA testing is not one of them. DNA
testing is currently a permissible crime-solving tool, making
familial DNA testing a logical next step. Additionally, the
accuracy and efficiency familial DNA testing provides to law
enforcement result in safer streets for society as a whole. This
need to provide safety for society outweighs any privacy
invasion individuals may perceive.
C. PROTECTING PRIVACY
In an effort to protect the privacy of individuals, while still
reaping the benefits of familial DNA searching, I propose three
148. E. Mosley, Incarcerated- Children of Parents in Prison Impacted, TEX.
DEP’T
OF
CRIM.
JUST.
(July
6–12,
2008),
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/pgm&svcs/gokids/gokids-articles-incarceratedchildren-of-parents-impacted.html.
149. Id.
150. NPR, supra note 139.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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safeguards on the use of familial DNA searching. First,
destruction procedures should be carefully outlined so as to
make sure that once the identity of a DNA match is acquired,
that the link between the DNA and the identity is destroyed.
The identity and DNA match is only useful during the actual
investigation. As a result, once the investigation ends, there is
no longer a need to have the identity of the partial match in the
same arena as the DNA. This safeguard will help assuage
concerns critics have about a government official having control
of their DNA.
A second way to properly safeguard familial DNA
searching is to institute a policy of informed consent. That is, if
a law enforcement official would like to obtain the DNA of an
individual in order to conduct a familial DNA search, the
individual first has to provide consent. This would be useful in
situations where law enforcement officials have a suspect in
mind, but have no means of getting a warrant to get that
individual’s DNA directly. In this situation, the police would be
able to use a family member’s DNA, but only after obtaining
her consent in order to determine whether the suspect is
related to the family member whose DNA was tested. Armed
with this information, law enforcement officials would be able
to satisfy the probable cause prong and obtain a warrant to get
the DNA from the actual suspect. In this scenario, consent
would serve as a means of protecting individuals from
incriminating their family members, but would also permit
individuals who choose so to help take a criminal off the street.
The final safeguard that law enforcement officials should
implement is to establish a minimum number of required allele
matches. Low stringency matches should not be permitted, as
they are not reliable enough to determine whether an
individual is related to someone or not. 153 Medium stringency
tests should be the norm, and law enforcement officials should
be required to use other investigative means to establish a
relationship between the partial match and the suspect. That
is, police should not knock on the door of every person who is a
partial match and ask them if they have a family member who
may have committed a crime. Instead, they should take the
identities of the partial matches, evaluate whether they have

153. Gabel, supra note 28, at 17 (explaining that a low stringency search is
only one allele out of a possible twenty-six is found to be in common between
the compared samples).
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family members that could potentially have committed the
crime in question, and then evaluate whether there is any
other information that ties that suspect to the crime. In cases
such as this, it may be possible to question the suspect directly
without ever contacting the individual whose DNA was a
partial match.
Implementing these procedural safeguards would help law
enforcement officials minimize any invasion of citizens’ privacy.
It would mitigate the fears critics have, while still permitting
law enforcement officials to conduct an efficient and effective
investigation. While the suggested safeguards would not fully
alleviate any intrusion into an individual’s privacy, they would
help alleviate concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Familial DNA testing presents unchartered waters for the
courts, but soon enough, the legal challenges will come. As
discussed in the analysis section, challengers will likely raise a
variety of legitimate privacy concerns that differentiate familial
DNA testing from traditional DNA testing. Despite these
concerns, the benefits familial DNA testing provides to society,
including increased accuracy in suspect identification, crime
deterrence, decreases in investigation time, financial savings,
and increased public confidence in the justice system, support
the contention that society’s interest outweighs the interest of
individual’s privacy. The courts’ reluctance to find DNA testing
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment lends credence
to the idea that the benefits society as a whole gains from the
swift, inexpensive, accurate method of keeping criminals off the
street outweigh any small intrusion into individuals’ privacy.
With a few procedural safeguards, such as destruction
procedures, an informed consent policy, and a minimum
required number of allele matches, the concerns opponents of
familial DNA testing may raise can be mitigated. In light of
this, familial DNA searching should be permitted in all fifty
states so as to utilize the technology most effectively to improve
public safety.

